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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
X

In the Matter of the Application ofl

Petitioner,

INDEX NO.:

-against-

TINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman of the New
York State Board of Parole, and THE NEW
YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
X
VERIFIED PETITION SEEKING ARTICLE 78
REVIEW OF DENIAL OF PAROLE TO PETITIONER AND ANNULLMENT OF
DENIAL

Petitioner

,I by his attorneys Heller, Horowitz & Feit, P.C., as and for his

Verified Petition, alleges as follows:
Introduction

.

1

Petitioner brings this Special Proceeding to review, and upon such review to annul,

the October 9, 2019 Denial of Parole to Petitioner by the Board of Parole Commissioners, which was

affirmed in the August 24, 2020 Decision of the Appeals Unit of the New York State Board of
Parole (“the Appeals Unit”)(collectively,“the Parole Denial”), and upon the record presented to the

Commissioners, to grant this Petition and reverse the Parole Denial and (A) direct that the
Petitioner’s Parole Application be granted; or, in the alternative, (B) direct that a prompt de novo

hearing on the Parole Application be held before Commissioners who did not sit on Petitioner’s prior
hearings. A copy of the Commissioners’ Decision is annexed hereto as Exhibit A; a copy of the

Appeals Unit’s Decision is annexed hereto as Exhibit B.

1
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Petitioner, who is currently fifty-eight years old and in poor health, has been in prison

for approximaely twenty - five years,having been convicted of murder in 1996. In a lengthy (albeit
boilerplate) Decision citing dozens of cases but making no genuine effort to apply those cases to

Petitioner’s situation, the Appeals Unit affirmed the Commissioner’s equally uninformative and
conclusory initial denial of parole to Petitioner. In doing so, the Commissioners (as well as the

Appeals Unit) effectively ignored a number of undisputed facts which, we respectfully submit,

renderedPetitioner a textbook example of an individual for whom continuedincarceration serves no
legitimate penal or societal purpose —especially in light of the “forward lookingparadigm” embodied

in Section 259-c of theExecutive Law and the Amendments to the Board’s Regulations following a
2011 change to the law and to the entire approach to parole decisions. See generally People v.

.

Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247 (2015); 9 N.Y.C.R.R., Sections 8002.2(a), 8002.3

.

3

Perhaps the most important of these facts—but by no means the only factor

militating strongly in favor of Petitioner’s release

— is that Petitioner is subject to an immediate

deportation order (“CPDO”) to his native Jamaica, meaning that the day he is releasedfrom prison
he will be placed in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody until they transport him

from the United States to Jamaica (where a large and loving family awaits him). Thus, the danger

that Petitioner will pose a future risk of committing a crime in the State of New York or the United
States is, not to put too fine a point on it, zero.
4.

It is well settled that the discretion of the Board in denying parole is not unlimited.

As the First Department has recognized, “the Board’s discretion is not unbridled and must be

.

.

exercised in accordance with law ” King v N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 430 (1st Dept.

1993). Moreover, where “there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety”,it is the duty

2
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of the reviewing court, on an Article 78 proceeding, to intervene and to correct the error. Matter of

.

Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc.3d 1009(A) (Sup Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005).

5.

As will be demonstrated below, when measured against these legal principles, the

Parole Denial cannot stand in this case. The Commissioners did not even mention the CPDO in their

initial denial and, while the Appeals Panel paid lip service to the CPDO, made no meaningful
attempt to do what the law requires—to explain in non-conclusory terms why, standing alone, the

mere “seriousness of the crime” trumped the deportation order and all of the other factors

(Petitioner’s low COMP AS score, his excellent record in prison, a welcoming family to ease his
post-release transition, etc.) that supported the granting of parole to Petitioner based on any

reasonable view of the record.
6.

When all is said and done, this Court has no choice but to conclude that the Parole

Denial was, for all intents and purposes and notwithstanding a passing and thoroughly conclusory
reference to the Petitioner’s alleged “lack of remorse”, entirely “backward lookingthat is, it

started, proceeded and ended with the fact that Petitioner committed a murder in 1996. The Parole
Denial thus violated the First Department’s admonition that in light of the Legislature’s

determination that the parole decision should be “guided by risk and needs principles”,parole cannot
be denied solely based on the seriousness of the offense. Matter of Rossakis v. N. Y.S. Board of

Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22,27 (1st Dept. 2016). See Matter ofMiranda v. New York State Parole Board,
2020 NY Slip Op. 33346(U) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2020). That is precisely what has occurred here,
and the Petition should accordingly be granted.
Timeliness of Petition and Venue

7.

This special proceeding is timely under CPLR 217 because it is filed within four

months of the issuance of the Decision of the Appeals Unit affirming the denial of parole to

3
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Petitioner by the Commissioners. Venue is proper in this Court under CPLR 506(b) because the

Commissioners conducted the remote parole hearing for Petitioner, which gave rise to the Parole

Denial, in New York County.
Summary of Argument
8.

In the Parole Denial, the Commissioners recognized that the murder conviction was

first serious infraction, and that during his two and one-half decades of incarceration,he
has “made significant strides in [his] academic and educational pursuits”, that his “disciplinary

record reflects satisfactory adjustments to DOCCS rules and regulations”, and that his “Risk and

...

Needs assessment reveals low scores.” The Parole Denial also stated that the Board “considered

.

certificates, educational attainments, letters of support and reasonable assurance ”

.

9

Nevertheless,the Board denied parole to Petitioner on the purported grounds that the

original crime—in which

shot the victim in connection with a dispute involving the sale

of a car and a few days after the victim had attacked

with a knife—“was violent, heinous

.

and shows a total disregard in conduct, which caused the death of the victim ” Accordingly—and

apparently based solely (or, at the very least, primarily) upon the nature of the original crime—the
release after twenty - five years in prison “would be

Parole Board found that

incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to
undermine respect for the law.” The Appeals Unit affirmed, finding no error in the Commissioners’
exercise of discretion and purported “weighing” of all of the statutory factors.

10.

The Parole Denial was “affected by an error of law [and] was arbitrary and

capricious” (CPLR 7803(3)) for the following reasons.
11.

First , the Board is obligated “to give fair consideration to each of the statutory factors

.

as to every person who comes before it ” Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Board of Parole, 146

4
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A.D.3 d 22 (1st Dept. 2016). Indeed, the Regulations require that “reason for the denial of parole

.

release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms

address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in Section 8002.2
were considered in the individual’s case.” Here, while the Parole Denial mentioned and paid lip

service to a number of the statutory factors that favored the parole of

there is no

indication that the Board engaged in any serious weighing or analysis to support its thoroughly
conclusory statement,parroting the statutory language of Executive Law Sec. 259, that

release would somehow be “incompatible with the welfare of society.” The Parole Denial,in short,

is the paradigmatic written decision that “summarily itemize[s] a petitioner’s achievements while
incarcerated or render[ s] a conclusory decision parroting the statutory standard.” Coaxum v. New
York State Board of Parole , 14 Misc.3 s 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006).

12.

To take one example,

COMPAS score indicated that he would be a “low

risk” to commit a future crime if released, and he was given a mental health status of Level 6,

meaning that there is no mental health issue that should concern the Board. (The COMPAS score is

consistent with the many letters of recommendation and other assessments from persons who know
and how he has behaved and matured while in prison.) The Regulations recognize the

importance of a COMPAS score to the parole decision, and require that theBoard “specify any scale
within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide an

individualized reason for such departure.” (9 N.Y.C.R.R., Sec. 8002.2(a))
13.

In other words, while the Board is certainly entitled to conclude that other statutory

factors outweigh the COMPAS score, the Parole Denial must, at the very least, explain why that is
so. With respect, a conclusory reference to the “needs of society”, the underlying crime and the

purported “superficial” nature of

“expression of remorse”, does not come close to

5
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complying with the legal mandate. See Matter

200431.1

of Coleman v. New York State Department

of

..

Corrections, 157 A D 3d 672 (2d Dept. 2018).

14.

Indeed, both the questions asked by the Commissioners during the hearing and the

Parole Denial itself leave absolutely no doubt that the essential predicate for the denial of parole—
and the justification for ignoring

.

stellar record in prison,his educational achievements

his extremely positive COMPAS score and the many positive letters of support and
recommendation—was the Board’s view as to the “callous[ness]” of the original offense. (While the

Parole Denial might give the impression otherwise,

has never attempted to justify or

minimize the seriousness and wrongfulness of what he did in 1996 in taking the life of another
human being. See infra.)

15.

The Board’s focus on the nature of the crime to the exclusion of everything else is, we

—

respectfully submit, impossible to reconcile with the statutory mandate made clear by a 2011

Amendment to the Executive Law,see People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247 (2015)

— that “the focus of

parole boards [must be] a forward-thinking paradigm, rather than a backward looking approach to

evaluating whether an inmate is rehabilitated and ready for release.” Matter ofBruetsch v. New York
State Dept ,

of Corrections, 43 Misc.3d 1223(A) (Sup. Ct. Sull. Cty. 2016). By giving dispositive

weight to a portion of one factor in Section 259(i)(2)(c)(a)(vii) (“the seriousness of the offense”), the

Parole Denial was arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law . Capiello v. New York State Board of
Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2004). Indeed, we think it no exaggeration to state
that to deny

arole would,in effect,be to endorse a per se rule that no person convicted of

murder should ever be released. In this regard, any doubt that the nature of the offense was the
beginning, middle and end of the Board’s analysis is put to rest by the very language of the

6
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Commissioners’ Decision, which stated that “the instant offense was violent” so

'‘' therefore...discretionary release...is not appropriate” (emphasis supplied).
16.

Second, the Parole Denial was also arbitrary because it failed to make any mention of

the overwhelmingly important fact that
in his

transfer

to

the custody

is subject to a deportation order which will result

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) the minute he is

releasedfrom prison; ICE officials will then transport him to Jamaica. The apparent failure to even
consider the outstanding deportation order—which is a statutory factor under sub-section (iv) and

which was extensively addressed during the hearing by the Commissioners—is completely baffling; a
Board’s failure to consider a pending deportation order, standing alone, has been held to require a

.

new hearing. Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc.3d 694 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty

2011).

1

17.

While

Iocs not contend that the deportation order operates as a per se get

out of jail free card, it was, at the very least, incumbent on the Board to at least explain in some

coherent fashion why it was being ignored and/or was presumably trumped by the other reasons for

continued incarceration upon which the Board presumably relied. This is particularly the case
because at the hearing

xplained that upon his return to Jamaica, he had a stable home, a

loving family and a job waiting for him.
18.

Third, the Commissioners never explained the basis for the conclusion that

emorse for shooting

s in 1992 was not sincere.

xpressed remorse

at least six times during the hearing, as well as in his personal statement and in his letter of apology.

That

in response to questions from the Commissioners, explained the circumstances

s “primary residence” after release would
The statement in the Parole Board Report that
, of course, completely erroneous and
)
Jamaica
was
in
secondary
residence
”
be the Bronx (with a “
demonstrates that the Board failed to comprehend the deportation order.

I
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surrounding the shooting does not,by any reasonable measure, makehis regret and remorse any less

genuine. We (and, respectfully, this Court) are, in short, left with the unmistakable impression that

the “superficiality of remorse” is just another way of saying that the crime itself justified the denial

. See Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304 (1 Dept. 2005) (rejecting Board’s
st

of parole to

“conclusions regarding lack of insight and remorse”, which was based on “no supportive facts”, as
“an inaccurate reading of the record”).
The Crime
19.

,after a jury trial, was sentenced to twenty-five years

On July 24, 1996

to life for murder in the second degree and to four-and-a-half to fifteen years for criminal possession

of a weapon in the second degree to run concurrently.
on November 19, 1992.

death o

.

20
hearing,

was convicted for the shooting

2

explained in his Personal Statement and in his testimony at the parole

As

, and had a disagreement about its

had purchased a used car from

condition and responsibility for certain parking tickets that had been issued on the car. During one

.

of their discussions about the car problems
resulting in fifteen stiches to
street was that

was attacked by

with a knife,

face. Thereafter, and learning that the word out on the

bought a gun. A few days later,

was going to kill

the two men again encountered each other, and

shot

to death.

was later arrested, convicted and sentenced.

2

to the
The facts set forth herein are taken from the materials that were submitted by
Board, and which form the record upon which the Commissioners and the Appeals Unit founded
their respective Decisions denying parole. A copy of the “Parole Packet” is annexed hereto as
Exhibit C. A copy of the transcript of the hearing before the Commissioners is annexed hereto as
Exhibit D. A copy of the COMPAS score is annexed hereto as Exhibit E.
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At the time of the incident, and at the time of his arrest.

200431.1

as employed at

and his only other brush with the law was a misdemeanor conviction for

marijuana possession. He had several young children, and was a devoted father. In attempting to

.

explain (but in no way to justify) why he acted as he did

has (in his Personal Statement
area of Jamaica, an

and at the parole hearing) pointed to (i) his childhood in the

extremely violent center of drug activity and gun violence; (ii) the prevalence of guns in the Bronx at
the time; (iii) the need to preserve one’s “standing in the street” and “street honor”; and (iv) the

genuine fear, based on the earlier assault by

and what he had heard on the street, that

was going to kill him.

22.

The Record also establishes that notwithstanding his difficult childhood of poverty

graduated from high school, was awarded and

and a culture of violence in Jamaica,

completed a four-year government apprenticeship scholarship, moved to New York City, was
continually employed in union jobs, and brought his partner and children to New York City to live

with him when he was financially able to do so. And as noted above, prior to his arrest for the

.

he had no serious criminal record

murder of

s Twenty-Five Years in Prison and His Plans if Released
as been incarcerated since 1996. During his twenty - five years in prison,

23.

he has had an exemplary disciplinary record, which record has been recognized by his placement in
where he currently resides. He has not had a disciplinary infraction since

the prison

2012 (when he was found with an unauthorized book), and his only infraction for violence was
twenty years ago.

24.

While in prison,

has earned his GED, attended a pre-college program and

I.

is now working on a Bachelor’s degree from

9
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commendation in many therapeutic programs, involving counseling other prisoners and nonviolent

conflict resolution. He has also consistently received positive evaluations (and promotions) for his
work in the infirmary, mattress factory, stock room and laundry.

has demonstrated

leadership skills in his community and religious organizations and instructional programs. He has

been the executive director of the

through which he has

organized financial support and food packages for Caribbean organizations providing hurricane

relief. And, he is an active church member, attending services on a regular basis.
25.

who is now 58 years old and had major back surgery approximately five

years ago, has been assessed at Level 4 on the COMPAS risk assessment tool, which means that he
presents an extremely low risk of reoffending.

if released, will live in his sister’s home

in Jamaica, and has a job (and many family members) waiting for him. Indeed,he has no choice but
to go to Jamaica because there is a pending deportation order against him, which will require upon

his release from prison his immediate transfer to ICE custody who will subsequently transport him
from the United States to Jamaica.
The Evidence Before the Board and the Parole Denial

.

Personal Statement, the COMPAS

The Board was presented with

26

evaluation, the Parole Board Packet for Conditional Parole for Deportation Only (CPDO), as well as
no fewer than thirty letters from family members, educational officials and others asking that he be

.

granted parole The Board also heard, of course, from

testimony,

irectly at the hearing. During his

xplained how he had matured and developed during his years in prison, and

his plans for the future if he was released. He also repeatedly expressed remorse and regret for the

decision he made twenty-five years earlier to get a gun and use it to kill
separate occasions,

expressed remorse for his actions andthe murder of|

10
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family. While the Commissioners stated

his awareness of the pain that he had caused

that they understood and appreciate

s accomplishments in prison, they spent much of the

hearing eliciting and commenting upon the facts of the crime, and concluding that “you

committed a heinous act of the murder of
27.

As noted above, in the Parole Denial, the Board focused substantially upon the nature

of the underlying crime; and that the ADA stated at the sentencing hearing that “this is a case,
clearly, of cold-blooded, premeditated and calculated murder.” The Board said that it took note of

.

s “institutional record and case plan., your efforts toward rehabilitation which shows that

you are program satisfied and have made significant strides in your academic and vocational pursuits

[and] satisfactory adjustment to DOCCS rules and regulations”, as well as the numerous

“certificates, educational attainments, letters of

support and reasonable insurance”, and the

.

COMPAS assessment “which revealed low scores ” But according to the Board, all of that was

—

outweighed—and “the welfare of society” required that he remain behind bars “due to your
criminal involvement commencing with acquiring an illegal handgun days before the instant

offense” and because “the instant offense was violent, heinous and shows a total disregard in
conduct...” The Board also stated that

s “expression of remorse for the crime was

superficial...”

The Decision of the Appeals Unit
28.

Petitioner took a timely administrative appeal from the Commissioner’s denial ofhis

parole application. In a Decision dated August 24, 2020, the Appeals Unit affirmed the
Commissioners’ denial. The Appeals Unit devoted most of its Decision to a justification for the

Commissioners’ emphasis on the nature of the crime as a basis for denying Petitioner parole, despite
the admittedly favorable COMPAS scores. The Appeals Unit acknowledged that the Commissioners

11
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“did not specifically reference the deportation order”,but excused that omission on the grounds that

they were “plainly aware of its existence and, in any event, was not required to assign equal weight
to or discuss every factor it considered in making its determination.” The Appeals Unit also noted

that “insight and remorse are permissible factors” to be considered in the denial of parole,but made
no effort to explain how the Commissioners could have rationally concluded that Petitionerfailed to

display such “insight and remorse.”
The Parole Denial Should be Reversed and
Hearing de Novo

29.

Should be Granted a Prompt

The Board, like any administrative agency,is required to follow its own Regulations

and the applicable law. Matter

of Bryant v. Coughlin, 77 N.Y.2d 642 (1991).

This means, at a

minimum, that the Board does not have unlimited discretion in making a parole decision, but must

consider all the factors enumerated in the Executive Law and the Regulations. Matter

of King,

supra. As the First Department has put it, “it is unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair

consideration to each of the statutory factors as to ever person who comes before it.” Matter of
Rossakisv. New YorkState Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 ( lstDept. 2016), quoting Matter of King,
supra. We explain below why the Parole Denial fails to pass muster,and why Petitioner was denied

the “fair consideration” to which he was entitled.
A.

The Board Gave Conclusive Weight to the Nature of the Crime, and Accorded No Real
Parole
Consideration to the Other Statutory Factors That Warranted

30.

A review of the transcript of the hearing and the Parole Denial leaves little doubt that

the principal basis for the Commissioners’ initial Decision was their determination that the

underlying crime was a heinous act of deliberate murder on the part o

and that no real

consideration was given to the other statutory factors that militated strongly in favor of

12
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.

release on parole Both the statements of the Commissioners at the hearing and the Parole Denial

indicate that the Panel concluded that no matter how minimal the risk of reoffending, and no matter
has changed and accomplished during the twenty-five years he has been

how much

imprisoned, his decision to buy a gun and use it against

that day in 1992 was so evil as

s continued incarceration. See Pulinario v. N.Y State Dep 7 of Corrections,

to mandate

42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct.N.Y. Cty. 2014) (“the Parole Board’s overwhelming emphasis was on

the offense...At the hearing, there was only passing references to the contents of petitioner’s

application...”).
31.

This was fundamental error because it is well settled that the “seriousness” of a parole

applicant’s offense is not, by itself, a rational or sufficient basis to deny parole. Indeed, this is the
controlling law in the First, Second and Fourth Departments. In Matter

ofRossakis, supra, for

example, the First Department held that the Board acted irrationally in focusing exclusively on the

seriousness of petitioner’s conviction and the decedent’s family’s victim impact statements without
giving genuine consideration to petitioner’s remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and
her lack of any prior violent petitioner’s remorse,institution achievements, release plan, and her lack

of any prior violent criminal history. Accord, Matter of King, supra (“...the legislature has

determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of
some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.); Ramirez v.

.

Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dept. 2014); Perfetto v. Evans, 112 A D.3 d 640 (2d Dept. 2013);

Huntley v. Evans, 77 A .D.3 d 945 (2d Dept. 2011) (“Where the Parole Board denies release to parole
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense in the absence of any aggravating circumstance,

it acts irrationally.”); Mitchell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dept. 2009) (While

the seriousness of the underlying offense remains acutely relevant in determining whether the

13
13 o f 26

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/ 20 / 2020 03 :16 PM]
NYSCEF DOC

.

.

NO

.

INDEX NO

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/ 21/ 2020

1

FUSL000097

200431.1
petitioner should be released on parole, the record supports the petitioner’s contention that theParole

Board failed to take other relevant statutory factors into account.); Johnson v. New York State Div. of

..

Parole, 65 A D 3d 838, 839 (4th Dept. 2009) (“violence associated with this terrible crime” not itself
a sufficient basis for denying parole); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 2018/100865 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.

Cty. 2019) (finding Board relied almost exclusively on the seriousness of the crime and statements

petitioner made at time of sentence). 3

.

32

While nodding to the other statutory factors that it was required to consider, the only

way to reasonably read and understand the Parole Denial is that, standing alone and without

consideration of anything else , the crime committed by

equires his parole to be denied.

.

Because that is inconsistent with applicable law, he is entitled, at the very least, to a new hearing

See Ely v. N.Y. State Board of Parole, No. 100407/16 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Cty. 2017) (denial of parole
arbitrary and capricious when Board focused unduly on petitioner’s murder of her husband to

exclusion of other statutory factors); Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep 7 ofCorrections, 46 Misc.3d 603,

.

607 (Sup. Ct. Sull Cty. 2014) (undue focus on nature of crime improper basis for denying parole);

Platten v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc.3d 1059, 1063 (Sup. Ct. Sull. Cty. 2015) (board

“cannot base its decision to deny parole solely on the serious nature of the underlying crime”).
33.

In this regard,there is one obvious but absolutely critical point, which is that a parole

denial is not insulated from review by the Court merely because the Decision recites that it has

The Third Department apparently takes a different view. Hamilton v. New York State Division of
Parole, 119 A.D.3 d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014). But lower court decisions in the Third Department have
interpreted the holding of Hamilton otherwise. See Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dept of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 46 Misc.3d 603 (Sup. Ct Sullivan Cty. 2014) (The holding in Hamilton “...does not
mean administrative parole decisions are virtually un-reviewable.”); Platten v. N. Y. State Bd Of
Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2015) (“A parole board cannot base its decision to
deny parole release solely on the serious nature of the underlying crime. The Hamilton decision did
not affect this prohibition.”)
3
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considered other factors besides the underlying crime. It is therefore hardly surprising that courts

have annulled the denial of parole where, as here, it is apparent that the actual sole reason was the

.

alleged seriousness of the petitioner’s crime. See, e.g., Menard v. N.Y State Board of Parole, 2019

WL 1115731 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2019) (annulling parole denial because the Board “focused heavily
on the underlying offense without giving sufficient consideration to the statutory factors”); Phillips
v. Stanford,No. 52579/19 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2019).

4

B.

The Parole Denial’s Central Predicate—that
s Release Would Be “Contrary to the
Welfare of Society”—Was Conclusory and Did No More than Parrot the Statutory Language

34.

It is well-settled that the Board does not discharge its obligation to fairly consider all

of the statutory factors by merely incorporating the boilerplate language into its denial decision. See
in re Ciaprazi v. Evans, 52 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2017); Ruzas v. New York State

Board of Parole, No. 1456/2016 slip op. at 4 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Oct. 18, 2017) (holding the
Board in contempt for conducting defective de novo interview after the Court set aside the initial
decision because “the Board summarily denied [petitioner’s] application without any explanation

.

other than by reiterating the laundry list of statutory factors The minimal attention, barely lip

service, given to these factors and to the COMPAS Assessment cannot be justified given the amount

of time already served.”). Put simply,“the Board’s determination must be stated in non-conclusory
terms ” Wallman v. Travis, supra-, see Matter

.

of Rossakis, supra; Executive Law § 259-1 (2) (a).

4

The importance of the principle that parole cannot be denied based solely upon the seriousness of
the underlying offense is illustrated by Ferrante v. Sanford, 172 A.D.3 d 331 (2d Dept. 2019), where
the Second Department, after reversing the first parole denial on the grounds that the Board had
focused exclusively on the underlying crime, went so far as to hold the Board in contempt for
denying parole to the petitioner in a subsequent de novo hearing again based solely on the
seriousness of the crime.
15
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In this case, the Board failed to articulate any rational, non-conclusory basis, other

than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, explaining why the Boardhad determined that “your
s] release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the

serious nature of the crime as to undermine the respect for the law.” That conclusion,of course,is a

.

-

word- for word lifting of the language of Executive Law § 259 The Board makes no attempt to
reconcile its conclusion with

s favorable risk assessment, which rates him at the lowest

risk of re-offending. It just says that none of that matters due to his criminal involvement acquiring

.

an illegal handgun days before the instant offense and more than twenty-five years ago

36.

In in re McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230 A (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., 2014), the

Court annulled a parole denial because it found that “while the Board discussed petitioner’s positive

activities and accomplishments at the hearing,it then concluded that his release was incompatible

with ‘public safety and welfare.’ The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this
conclusion. 1/ appears to have focused only on petitioner ’s past behavior without articulating a

rational basisfor reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible with the welfare of
society at this time. ’’) (emphasis supplied).

37.

To the same effect is the Second Department’s recent decision in Rivera v. Standford,

172 A.D.3d 872 (2d Dept. 2019). There, the Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of an Article
78 petition challenging parole denial on the grounds that the petitioner’s “release was not compatible

with the welfare of society” as “without support in the record.”
38.

Precisely the same is true in our case. In the absence of any indication that the Board

gave serious consideration to the statutory factors,its Parole Denial cannot be sustained. See Morris
v. N.Y. State Dept

of Corr. & Cmty Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty., 2013)

(“the Board failed to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why petitioner’s release was
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‘incompatible with the public safety and welfare’ and why there was ‘a reasonable probability [he]
would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.’...the Board ‘should be well able to
articulate the reasoning’ for its decision, ‘if it were come to reasonably, in a non-arbitrary, un-

capricious manner.’”).
39.

In Hill v. New York State Board of Parole, 2020 WL 6259551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.

2020), decided just a few weeks ago, this Court annulled a parole denial on the grounds that, even
though “the decision reflects the Board’s careful consideration of [the seriousness of the crime and

the “tragic effects” on the victim]”, “the Board failed to articulate the reasons for the determination

with respect to Mr. Hill’s low COMPAS Risks and Needs Assessment Scores or ‘to provide an
individualized reason for this departure’ in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8002.2.” As a result, the
Court found that “the Board’s determination was arbitrary and capricious and irrational bordering on

impropriety”; and that “its decision...lacks a foundation for its determination that Mr. Hill, at
present, poses a danger to society, and demonstrates that the Board, while referring to the statutory

factors, did not consider all statutory factors,but focused solely on the underlying crime.” { Id. at *6-

7). The Parole Denial here exhibits precisely the same fatal flaws and, as inHill, should be annulled
by this Court.

C.

The Parole Decision Indicates that the Commissioners Failed to Consider
Immigration Status for Impending Deportation
40.

s

Immigration status, including an impending deportation order,is a statutorily required

factor that the Board is obligated to consider. N.Y. Exec Law, 259-i(2XCXA)(4). The Board’s
failure to consider a deportation order as part of its decision to deny parole is grounds for a de novo
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interview and review. See Thwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cty.

2011): Ciaprazi v. Evan, supra.

41.

To be sure, mention was made of the pending deportation in the transcript, and it is

not unreasonable to assume that the Commissioners may have been aware of it when they rendered

their Decision. However, the Commissioners were apparently of the (absolutely incorrect) view
that the deportation order was somehow not absolute, and that there was a possibility that

could remain in the United States after his release. This is the only way to explain the
Commissioner’s question/comment at the hearing to the effect that “So,Iwant you to talk about both
your plans here, and if you are deported what your plans are if you are to be returned to Jamaica?”

(emphasis supplied).

42.

We frankly have no way of knowing whether and to what extent that mistake of fact

in understanding the absolute nature of the deportation order contributed to the ultimate decision to
deny parole to

But what we do know is that reliance on inaccurate information by the

Board is itself a basis for a new hearing. Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3 d 800 (3 d Dept. 2004); Edge v.
Hammock , 80 A.D.2d 953 (3d Dept. 1981) (denial of parole must be annulled when it is based on
erroneous information). And given the stakes for Petitioner (another two years until the next parole

hearing that he will be forced to remain incarcerated), the very distinct possibility (if not likelihood)

that this error infected the result is not something that should be borne by Petitioner. 5
43.

But even more baffling, the pending deportation order against

which

- is not even

means that if released he will not spend a single day as a free person in New York

mentioned in the actual Parole Denial! There is absolutely no indication that in reaching its

5

s appeal from the deportation order was denied, meaning that it is now final.
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decision, the Board even considered the import of the deportation order and, more specifically,how
s removal from the United States upon release could be squared with its (boilerplate)

conclusion that “your release would be incompatible with the welfare of society.” And this egregious

failure is in no way cured by (i) the supposition that the Board was “aware” of the Deportation Order
(maybe yes and maybe no); and (ii) could have found it outweighed by other factors

if it had

conducted a “weighing” analysis. See Galan-Martinez v. N.Y. S. Div. of Parole, 2010 WL 3613152

. . ..

(Sup Ct N Y Cty. 2010) (annulling parole denial because Board did not consider pending

deportation order).
D.
The Parole Denial Failed to Explain in any Meaningful Fashion Why the Board was
Departing from
s COMP AS Scores

44.

In both the hearing and in the Parole Denial, the Board recognized that

s

COMPAS scores indicated an extremely low risk of recidivism. Nevertheless, the Board, in

deciding that

|must remain in prison, effectively gave the scores no weight. The Parole

Denial states: “We have reviewed the results of your Risk and Needs assessment which revealed
low scores, but we depart from it due to your criminal involvement commencing with acquiring an
illegal handgun days before the instant offense.” In other words, the fact that

ould not

commit any future crimes, had no mental health problems and had a loving family, a stable living
arrangement and a job waiting for him in Jamaica counted for nothing because in 1996 he made a

terrible decision and committed a murder.
45.

This demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of when a COMPAS departure is

appropriate and, more broadly, the “forward looking” purposes of parole. First of all, the panel

violated the requirement in the regulations that the Board must state why they are departing from

“any scale” of the risk assessment tool. 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 (a) (“...the Board shall specify any scale
19
19 o f 26

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/ 20 / 2020 03 :16 PM]
NYSCEF DOC

.

.

NO

.

INDEX NO

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/ 21/ 2020

1

FUSL000097

200431.1
within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide an

individualized reason for such departure.”) The scales include risk of felony violence, risk of
absconding, etc. In

s case, the Board failed to note which scales were low risk and were

being departed from and why, instead making one sweeping statement about the COMPAS as a

.

whole. And, in this case, the COMPAS departure bears no relationship to risk to the community
which shows that the Board was not “guided by risk and needs principles,” as required.
46.

As courts have held, the Board may not adopt the COMPAS tool andthen effectively

disregard its findings. Comfort v. NYS Board

of Parole, Index No. 1445/2018 (Dec. 21, 2018)

(Acker, J.) ( de novo granted where COMPAS score was low risk but the Board’s decision said the

individual was unlikely to live at liberty without violating the law); Diaz v. NYS Board of Parole, 42

..

Misc.3d 532, 535, 536 (Sup. Ct., Cayuga Cty 2013) (COMPAS administered but no indication

Board considered it). It is, we submit, completely at odds with the Regulation for the Board to
disregard COMPAS because of the nature of the prior offense instant offense (as the Board didhere).

Rather, the discretion to depart from the COMPAS recommendation relates to whether the person
can live and remain at liberty without violating the law. As the Commissioners themselves seemed to

recognize, the factual record on that issue required an answer in the affirmative in the case of

47.

Separate and apart from the inconsistency of the Board’s decision-making process

with the mandate set forth in the Regulations, the virtually exclusive focus of the Board on the nature
of the crime cannot be squared with what the Court of Appeals has stated is the prospective approach

.

to parole In 2011, the Legislature mandated that the Board establish a forward looking approach to

parole consideration by amending the statute to require “written procedures...incorporate [ing] risk

...” People v Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247 (2015). By definition,such an approach—

and needs principles

20
20 of 26

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/ 20 / 2020 03 :16 PM]
NYSCEF DOC

.

.

NO

.

INDEX NO

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/ 21/ 2020

1

FUSL000097

200431.1

while by no means requiring the Board to ignore and not consider the seriousness of the crime
committed—forecloses the back of the hand dismissal o

s COMPAS scores and his other

achievements during his twenty-five years in prison, which including minimizing his excellent
disciplinary record (no infractions since 2012); his educational achievements (received GED and two
years into his Bachelor’s degree); prison work history that includes receiving promotions and

excellent evaluations; strong letters of support from family, friends, organizations and DOCSS
employees; expressed remorse; low risk of recidivism posing no risk to community; a

comprehensive release Plan with all components in place and no known objections from the victim’s
family or community to
48.

.

s parole

We do not dispute that the COMPAS score is not required to be “the fundamental

basis for release decisions”, that it “cannot mandate a particular result”, and that it “did not eliminate
the requirement that the Board conduct a case by case review of each inmate by considering the
statutory factors, including the instant offense.” The point, however, is that for the parole denial

decision to comport with applicable law, the Commissioners must explain—with specificity and
without generalities,platitudes or boilerplate—why they have chosen to depart from the COMPAS

indicators. They utterly failed to do so here.
49.

In Matter of Coleman, supra, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s

denial of an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of parole where, as here, the COMPAS
scores strongly favored release. The Court held that “notwithstanding the seriousness of the

underlying offense, the parole board’s determination to deny the petitioner release onparole evinced
irrationality bordering on impropriety.” The same is true here.
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.

E

s Alleged “Superficial Expression of
The Board’s Denial of Parole Based on
Remorse” Ignored Overwhelming Objective Evidence

50.

In the Parole Denial, the Commissioners stated that

s “expression of

remorse for the crime was superficial with little regard for the victim’s family and the seriousness of

... The panel recommends you continue to gaininsight into your behavior and respect for

your crime

the law.”

.

51

It is difficult to know what to make of this,and we believe that the “superficiality of

.

remorse” ground was, in reality, just another way of saying that the seriousness of the crime

standing alone, was enough to deny parole to

In any event, and with all due respect to

the Commissioners, their subjective views of his alleged “superficial remorse” (not supported by any

reference to a statement by

at the hearing or in anything contained in any of his other

submissions) should not be allowed to override objective evidence of the last 25 years. See Kellogg
v. NYS Board of Parole, 159 A.D.3d 439 (1st Dept. 2018) (affirming supreme court’s annulment of

parole denial based on board’s subjective finding of lack of remorse, and stating that denial ofparole
on those grounds was “irrationality bordering on impropriety”); Matter

of Wallman, supra (“the

Board’s perfunctory discussion of petitioner’s alleged lack of insight” is insufficient to justify denial

.

of parole); Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Sull Cty. 2010) (board’s finding of

alleged lack of remorse is contradicted by the actual record).
52.

|’s genuine contrition and remorse—completely

The objective evidence of

—

ignored by both the Commissioners and the Appeals Unit is as follows:
1.

[at least six times (p. 9, p.16, p.21, p. 22, p.23, p.27) during the parole hearing
expressed his remorse. “I am very remorseful for taking
s life. The pain I
have caused his family. Saying sorry is not enough, it will never be enough.” (p. 27)
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2. Commissioner Mitchell indicated during the hearing: “I see you have written a letter of
apology to the apology bank” (p.21 of Parole Board Interview).
responded:
“there was no word or justification thatIcan use to justify my irrational action by taking
life. I wrote that letter to the family express my remorse what 1have done, the
pain I have caused this family, and I humbly express my remorse, and ask for their
forgiveness.” (p.22)

ms

.

3 In his Personal Statement submitted in his Parole Board Packet,
expresses his
remorse: “My actions not only affected his family and my own but the community as a
whole, andIknow and truly understand the depth of my actions and the harm that I have
caused...1am truly remorseful for my destructive action, andIrealize that the stitches in my
face are nothing in comparison to taking his life.
4. Commissioner Mitchell indicates “we reached out to the DA, and the Courts and we have not
gotten any correspondence back from them that’s been negative, so that is in your favor”
(p.26)

5. As far as is known the family and community did not submit any letters requesting his
continued incarceration.

.

6 In the eighteen letters of support from family and friends (in Parole Board Packet), fifteen
as expressed his remorse to them.
explicitly state that

Executive Vice President of
7. In a Letter of Support from
|she expressed that in their sixteen-week Longtermers Responsibility Project,
expressed his deep remorse and the other participants appreciated his
id not express his profound remorse and
openness. There was not a session when
an increased understanding of himself and the poor judgment that led to his actions” (in

..

Parole Board Packet).

. __ Lettej

8

Director of Program Marketing at the
from
)
(in Parole Board Packet an anti-gang anti- violence program which
t
their
evening class at Sing Sing, he wrote: “1 do not make such a
\
recommendation lightly. To warrant such considerationIneed to be assured that the inmate
has shown remorse for his actions, that he has prepared himself for release by taking
advantage of educational, vocational and cultural opportunities while incarcerated.”

f.
9.

upport

^^

ocacy letter from his volunteers at the
(in the Parole Board Packet) indicates that
told us that when his
knowing
loss
her father, who was
she experienced from not
granddaughter expressed the
murdered, it brought home to him in a very personal way the tragedy he inflicted on
child.”
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53.

How the Board could have, in light of this overwhelming evidence, concluded that

should remain in prison because his remorse was “superficial” is, in the words of the First
Department in Kellogg, “irrationality bordering on impropriety.”
Conclusion

53.

In Cappiello v.N.Y. State Board of Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010(A), 2004 WL 3112629

(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2004), at * 3, the Court stated that “the Parole Board’s failure to qualitatively

determine whether petitioner presented a current danger to society, based on all of the relevant
statutory factors, was a clear abdication of its statutory duty.” (emphasis supplied). Here,it is simply

impossible for any rational fact finder to conclude that Petitioner “presents] a current danger to
society.” Rather,

is an excellent candidate for Conditional Parole for Deportation

Only (CPDO). Furthermore, even putting to one side the deportation order, the Parole Denial

directing that he remain in prison was flatly inconsistent with the applicable Statute and Regulations,
and failed to give meaningful consideration to all of the mandatory factors,instead giving dispositive

.

weight to the offense and ignoring all of the other factors (COMPAS scores,achievements in prison

.

health and age) that strongly indicate that parole is appropriate

.

54

.

record

Under these circumstances, the Parole Denial should be reversed and, on this
hould be granted parole. At the very least, the matter should be remanded for

a new hearing before a different panel of Commissioners.

6

6

We recognize that the generally accepted remedy for the Board’s wrongful denial of parole is a
new hearing before a different panel of Commissioners, rather than release Kellogg, supra; Newton
v. Dennison, 47 A.D.3 d 538 (1st Dept. 2008). But where, as here, the facts supporting parole are
essentially undisputed, we urge this Court to consider whether the most appropriate remedy should
be an order directing Petitioner’s release; otherwise, Petitioner is likely to remain in prison for a
longer period of time than warranted by the law and the facts while a new hearing is scheduled and
held. We note that the Courts have, in appropriate cases involving prisoners (but, concededly not
denials of parole by the Board), determined that the most appropriate remedy was not a remand for a

.
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WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court grant the relief requested in the

Petition, together with such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper.
Dated:
November

, 2020

/

ER, HOR

By:

/

..

ITZ & FEIT, P C

Stuart A. Blander

260 Madison Avepae, 17th Floor
New York, New/York 10016
(212) 685 -760& (917) 282-4163
Attorneys for Petitioner

.

new hearing,but rather the granting of the substantive relief rquested by the prisoner See Wyehe v.
N.Y.S. Board of Parole, 66 A.D.3d 541 (1st Dept. 2009) (parole revocation hearing); Nance v.
Arinucci, 147 A.D.3d 1180 (3d Dept. 2017) (prison disciplinary hearing); Delgado v. Fischer, 100
A.D.3 d 1171 (same). We would analogize the situation to an appellate court’s authority to “search
the record” and grant summary judgment to even a non-movant. See Commissioner v. Weissman, 90
A.D.3d 417 (1st Dept. 2011).
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss.:

COUNTY OF KINGS

STUART A. BLANDER, being duly affirmed, deposes and says:
Iam a member of Heller, Horowitz & Feit, PC, attorneys for Petitioner. 1 have read the

annexed Petition, and know the contents thereof and the same is true to the best of my
knowledge, except as to those matters therein which are alleged upon information and belief, and
as to those matters,Ibelieve them to be true. The basis of my knowledge is my review of the

underlying file and the decisions under review, as well as my conversations with Petitioner’s
parole advocate. Imake this Verification because my office is
County in which the petitioner currently resides.

Sworn to before me this
day of November, 2020
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Notary Public
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